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NOTES
Once a court has jurisdiction, its power should not be frustrated
by venue provisions unless the purpose behind those provisions
is being served.
The Rutland case, like the Mason case, indicates a tendency
of the federal courts, at least in the Second Circuit, to accept the
realities of business forms when resolving issues of venue and
jurisdiction, a tendency which has been all too long delayed.
X
AN APPRAISAL OF JUDICIAL RELUCTANCE TO IMPLY AN INDEM-
NITY CONTRACT IN TIME-BARRED BREAcH OF WARRANTY SUITS
Introduction
In a New York action a third-party plaintiff has the right
to indemnity only when he can show that (as between himself
and the third-party defendant) there exists the relationship of'
"active-passive" tort-feasor or there is an express contract to
indemnify. This comment will endeavor to demonstrate that the
current limitation on an indemnity cause of action is unreasonable,
and further that it fosters injustice and encourages collusive
fraud, especially when the statute of limitations has run on the
underlying cause of action.
New York Case Law
In a recent case' the defendant, a general contractor under
contract with plaintiff to construct a building, was sued for
damages for non-compliance with specifications regarding the
installation of a fuel tank. Plaintiff alleged that the improper
installation caused the tank to become corroded and thus unfit
for use. Under CPLR 1007 the defendant impleaded its
subcontractor, who had installed the tank, seeking indemnification
for any possible liability to the plaintiff. More than six years
had elapsed since the execution of the contract between the
contractor (third-party plaintiff) and the subcontractor (third-
party defendant). In dismissing the third-party complaint the
court held that the statute of limitations barred any action
thereon. Defendant-contractor contended that the statute of
limitations 2 did not bar the suit since the third-party cause
of action was one for indemnity, which would accrue only
1 City & County Say. Bank v. M. Kramer & Son, 43 Misc. 2d 731, 252
N.Y.S.2d 224 (Sup. Ct 1964).
2 CPLR 213.
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when plaintiff obtained judgment against the defendant and
defendant paid that judgment.3  In rejecting this contention,
the Supreme Court, Albany County, merely stated that, as a
matter of substantive law, there was no basis for an indemnity
claim at bar; that the third-party cause of action was one
for simple breach of contract; that the breach occurred at the
time of installation; and that, measured from that time, the
contractual period of limitations had expired and the third-party
action was barred.
This holding appears to find support in C.K.S., Inc. v.
Helen Borgenicht Sportswear, Inc.4  There the third-party sum-
mons and complaint were served in 1963. The complaint
alleged that in 1956 the third-party plaintiff purchased cloth
from the third-party defendant, which proved to be unfit
for its intended use and caused injury to the plaintiff in the
main action. The third-party plaintiff pleaded an indemnity
cause of action. The court held that the only cause of action
was in breach of warranty and that it was barred by the six-year
statute of limitations.
The result of these holdings is that the defendant (third-
party plaintiff) is prevented from making himself whole against
the party who, he contends, is truly at fault, because though the
main plaintiff's cause of action against the defendant is timely
v1 interposed, the impleader cause of action is not. If indemnity
is not allowed, the effect is to immunize the actual wrong-
doer by compelling the party, whom we may describe as only
"passively" liable (by analogy -to the tort realm), to make good
for the active wrongdoer's conduct. The query then is: Does
no implied indemnity agreement arise in such a situation? Stated
differently: Will a cause of action in indemnity lie when the
basis for the "action-over" is not tortious conduct, but breach
of contract or breach of warranty?
The courts in the State of New York have replied negatively
to these questions in the few instances where the problem arose.
They have confined the "indemnity" action, allowance of which
would solve the third-party plaintiff's statute of limitations dilemma,
to cases involving "active" and "passive" negligence and express
contracts to indemnify. 5 However, the contention that an action
for indemnity is proper in breach of warranty and contract areas
3 See Valstray Serv. Corp. v. Board of Elections, 2 N.Y.2d 413, 141
N.E.2d 565, 161 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1957).
4 22 App. Div. 2d 650, 253 N.Y.S.2d 56 (1st Dep't 1964).
5 See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sheila-Lynn, Inc., 185 Misc. 689, 57
N.Y.S.2d 707 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd, 270 App. Div. 835, 61 N.Y.S.2d 373
(lst Dep't 1946) ; Dolgoff v. Schnitzer, 209 App. Div. 511, 205 N.Y. Supp.
11 (1st Dep't 1924).
[ VOL. 39
NOTES
without an express contract to indemnify is not without judicial'
recognition.
In W.T. Grant Co. v. Uneeda Doll Co.6 the plaintiff, a
Connecticut retailer, instituted suit for breach of warranty against
the New York manufacturer from whom it purchased dolls for
resale in Connecticut. The plaintiff alleged that a breach of war-
ranty suit was pending against it in Connecticut, brought by a
purchaser whose child was injured while playing with one of the
defendant's dolls. Plaintiff contended that if it were found liable
for breach of warranty and had to pay damages in that action,
it would be because of the defendant's breach of warranty and,
therefore, the defendant would be liable to it for the amount of
the Connecticut judgment. Special term construed the plaintiff's
complaint as stating a cause of action in indemnity, and dismissed
the action because there was no showing of payment by the
plaintiff. On appeal, the appellate division, first department, re-
versed, holding that the complaint stated a good cause of action
for breach of warranty and that the action was not premature in
view of the fact that CPLR 3014 allows hypothetical pleadings.7
However, in his dissenting opinion, Justice Eager indicated that
he would affirm the decision of the special term on the ground
that the complaint stated a cause of action in indemnity, and
such claim was at that time premature. He declared that "on
the face of the complaint, the cause pleaded is one for indemni-
fication in the event that in the future there is a recovery against
the plaintiff in the pending action . . . but . . . a cause [of action]
for indemnification has not yet accrued." 3
Therefore, following the reasoning of Justice Eager, even
though the wrongful conduct which gave rise to the plaintiff's
liability was breach of warranty and not negligence, if the plaintiff
had paid the judgment in Connecticut (either voluntarily, or
by order of a court) he could have obtained indemnification
against the defendant. Likewise, if the claim were interposed
by way of a third-party pleading in a New York litigation, the
pleading would be sustained on an indemnity theory, because
CPLR 1007 allows a defendant to implead a third party only
if that third party would be required to indemnify him. If the
breach of warranty would be so interposable on the indemnity
theory required by CPLR 1007, why should third-party plaintiff
be deprived of the indemnity theory by the statute of limitations?
In Schubert v. August Schubert Wagon Co.,9 Judge Cardozo
pointed out that it is not the legal liability, but the loss which is
determinative in deciding whether a cause of action for indemnity
619 App. Div. 2d 361, 243 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1st Dep't 1963).
7Id. at 363, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 430.
8 Id. at 364, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 431. (Emphasis added.)
9 249 N.Y. 253, 164 N.E. 42 (1928).
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will lie. Such being the case, it would appear immaterial whether
the underlying wrong was a breach of warranty or negligence.
(In Schubert it was negligence.) This is illustrated by Dunn v.
Uvalde Asphalt Paving Co.,10 where the court stated that "indem-
nity rests upon the principle that every one is responsible for
his own wrong, and if another person has been compelled to pay
the damages which the wrongdoer should have paid, the latter
becomes liable to the former."" All of that reasoning has equal
vigor in the breach of warranty suit.
The Restatement of the Law of Restitution offers further
evidence of the all-encompassing breadth of the indemnity action;
"a person who, in whole or part, has discharged a duty which is
owed by him, but which as between himself and another should
have been discharged by the other, is entitled to indemnity from
the other. . . ."12 In Brown v. Rosenbaum, 3 Chief Judge Lehman
cited the above section of the Restatement and indicated that it
correctly reflected the law in New York.'14  He stated that when
"payment by one person is compelled, which another should have
made . . . a contract to reimburse or indemnify is implied by
law." "' There is nothing in the breach of warranty situation that
would countenance a disregard of that implication.
The Federal Approach
In recent years the federal courts have recognized the wide
scope of the indemnity cause of action and have moved away from
the practice of allowing indemnity in only "active" and "passive"
tort-feasor situations. Indemnity has been granted when the courts
have discovered a breach of a "consensual obligation" between
the parties. This is particularly true in the numerous cases where
shipowners have had to pay damages for injuries sustained aboard
their ships and would have been denied indemnity against the
stevedores who created the unsafe conditions because of the ex-
clusive tort liability provisions of the Longshoremen and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act.'6
10 175 N.Y. 214, 67 N.E. 439 (1914).
1 Id. at 217, 67 N.E. at 439.
12 RESTATEMENT, RFs'rrUTIoN § 76 (1937).
"3287 N.Y. 510, 41 N.E.2d 77 (1942).
14 Id. at 518, 41 N.E.2d at 80.
15Id. at 518-19, 41 N.E.2d at 81. (Emphasis added.) For further evi-
dence of the immateriality of the underlying cause of action, see Boston
Woven-Hose & Rubber Co. v. Kendall, 178 Mass. 232, 59 N.E. 657 (1901);
see also Degnon Contracting Co. v. City of New York, 202 App. Div. 390,
196 N.Y. Supp. 63 (1st Dep't 1922), modified, 235 N.Y. 481, 139 N.E. 580
(1923).
1644 Stat. 1426 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §905 (1958); 64 Stat. 1271 (1950),
33 U.S.C. § 933 (1958). For discussions of some of the more important cases,
see generally Kolius & Cecil, Indemnity Suits By Vessel Owner Against Stev-
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Recognizing the inequity in immunizing the actual wrongdoer,
the United States Supreme Court in Ryan Stevedoring Co. v.
Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp.'7 granted indemnity to a shipowner. The
Court concluded that an agreement to perform stevedoring oper-
ations gives rise to a "consensual obligation" on the part of the
stevedoring company to perform their functions safely and properly
and that a breach of this "consensual obligation" will give rise
to a cause of action for indemnity. According to the Court this
right of indemnity "springs from an independent contractual right"
and does not arise because of negligence.',8
A more general statement of the Ryan rationale is found in
Curtis v. A. Garcia Y Cia.'9 The court stated that the
undertaking of an independent contractor to perform a job carries with it
a promise, implied in fact, that the operation will be conducted in a safe,
skillful and generally workmanlike manner. Though such a contract may
contain no express agreement to indemnify, a breach of this warranty of
workmanlike performance, which results in loss to the owner by way of
liability to a third person in damages, is redressed by imposing an obligation
to indemnify upon the responsible contractor.20
Also indicative of this trend is the language employed by the court
in United States v. Savage Truck Line, Inc.21
The existence of a contractual relationship between joint wrongdoers, and
the breach of the duty by the one burdened therewith in the course of per-
forming a separate and independent act without which the injury would not
have occurred, are weighty circumstances in identifying the principal offender
and saddling him with the liability of an indemnitor.22
It is submitted that the rationale of these cases is readily
applicable to the principal cases (City & County Sav. Bank v. M.
Kramer & Son23 and C.K.S., Inc. v. Helen Borgenicht Sportswear,
Inc.24). For example, in the Kramer case, under the contract
between the third-party plaintiff and the third-party defendant,
the responsibility for proper installation was upon the subcontractor.
edoring Contractor: A Search For The Limits of The Ryan Doctrine, 27 INs.
COUNSEL J. 282 (1960); Ray, The Liability of the Shipowner for Injuries
Aboard Ship to Shoreside Workers and the Shipowner's Right to Indemnity
Against Such Workers' Employers, 27 INS. CouNsEL . 642 (1960).
I7350 U.S. 124 (1956). See also Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema
Operating Co., 355 U.S. 563 (1958).
'
8 Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 131-32
(1956).
19272 F.2d 235 (3d Cir. 1959).201d. at 237.
21209 F.2d 442 (4th Cir. 1953).
22 Id. at 447.
23Supra note 1.4 Supra note 4.
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He did not install properly and thus breached the contract. That
breach was the proximate cause of the breach of the original
contract thus giving rise to the defendant's (third-party plaintiff's)
liability to the main plaintiff. Applying the Ryan rationale we
can say that the third-party defendant has breached an independent
"consensual obligation" which in turn has given rise to defendant's
third-party plaintiff's liability, and therefore, should be cloaked in
the garb of indemnitor in order to prevent an obvious injustice.
Conclusion
It can therefore be concluded: (1) that the current New
York practice of limiting indemnity to only those situations involving
"active" and "passive" tort-feasors serves no legitimate end; in a
great many instances it operates only to insulate the actual wrong-
doer; (2) that within the concept of the indemnity cause of action
there is no inherently prohibitive element which would bar its
application in a breach of contract or breach of warranty situation;
(3) that in all situations where indemnity is allowed the court
is seeking to do what is just and equitable based upon the
relationship of the parties. Therefore, in determining whether
or not indemnity should be allowed in a particular case, the
court's primary consideration should be the effect of its disallowance.
After reviewing the cases and authorities on the subject it
appears that in the "active-passive" negligence area (the traditional
area in which the obligation to indemnify is implied) the allowance
of the action is based upon the law's notion of what is fair and
proper between the parties; and that by implying the indemnity
cause of action the courts were seeking to deny unjust enrichment
to the party who is actually at fault.25  As Professors Meriam
and Thornton have pointed out, the allowance of the indemnity
cause of action, in the early New York cases involving "active"
and "passive" negligence, was a manifestation of the inherent
notions of fairness in the minds of the judiciary, struggling to find
expression. 6 The courts in these early cases sought to place the
blame on the actual wrongdoer under the principle that no one
should be permitted to escape the consequences of his own wrong-
ful conduct." It was logic which impelled the courts to imply
25 See Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA.
L. REv. 130, 147 (1932) ; see also Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Be-
tween Tortfeasors, 22 CORNELL L.Q. 469 (1937); Davis, Indemnity Between
Negligent Tort-feasors: A Proposed Rationale, 37 IowA L. Ray. 517 (1952);
PROssER, ToRTs § 48 (3d ed. 1964).
26 Meriam & Thornton, Indemnity Between Tortfeasors: An Evolving
Doctrine in the New York Court of Appeals, 25 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 845, 848
(1950).
27 Village of Port Jervis v. First Nat'l Bank, 96 N.Y. 550, 555-56
(1884).
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an indemnification contract in order to mitigate the harshness
of common-law doctrines which imposed liability without fault.-
There is, therefore, ample common-law basis whereby the courts
can, and there are compelling reasons of fairness which dictate
that the courts should, imply the obligation of the actual wrong-
doer to indemnify the one who has been obliged by law to make
good for something that is really the sole fault of the former.
If this indemnification theory is adopted by the courts, the statute
of limitations, used so unjustly in the main cases, would pose
no problem. The "indemnity" claim would not arise until payment
by the one seeking indemnity, and in the impleader context there
would, therefore, be no statute of limitations pleadable by the
wrongdoer as a defense. The main cases permit the actual wrong-
doer to use the statute of limitations against one to whom the
law was never intended to apply. The one asserting the claim
here is not guilty of delay. There was no claim against the actual
wrongdoer until the third-party plaintiff was sued by the injured
party. Even were he to bring his third-party action at the earliest
possible moment, the rule of the main cases may require the
holding that he is already barred by the statute of limitations.
For example, M (manufacturer) sells items to R (retailer)
on April 1, 1958. R puts them in stock and on June 1, 1958,
R sells one to P. P sues for breach of warranty on June 1,
1964. R is barred by the statute of limitations from indemnifying
himself against M because, under the cases, there is no indemnity
obligation. There is only a breach of warranty, which is held
to run against R from the time of the sale from M to R, not
from R to P. Such a situation presents not merely an injustice,
but a possibility of collusive wrongdoing between P and M to which
the judicial doors should be tightly shut. If M approached P
after hearing of a dispute between P and R, M could have
prevailed upon P to delay suit against R until after April 1, 1964.
On that date the cause of action against R would be alive, but
that which R might have against M would be dead. It is no
answer to say that such instances will be uncommon (even in
view of the recent removal of the privity requirements in warranty
cases). The reply is that, as to dates, there was just such a
situation in the main cases.
,/ It took no legislation to bring about the implied obligation
to indemnify in the active-passive tort-feasor sphere. In our even
more enlightened age, it should require no legislation for the courts
to extend this theory to the area of breach of warranty.
28 Leflar, mtpra note 25, at 148.
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